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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880168-CA
Priority No. 2

CHARLENE ANN HOLMES,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case and
Statement of Facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at
vii, 1-4.

Appellant takes this opportunity to reply briefly to

Points II and III in Respondent's Brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The initial detention of the vehicle in which Ms. Holmes
was a passenger constituted a seizure of both Ms. Holmes and the
driver, and the officers lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion
upon which to permit such detention.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS A SEIZURE.
(Reply to Point II of Respondent's Brief)
The State contends in Point II of Respondent's Brief at 7
that the initial stop of the vehicle did not constitute a seizure of

Ms. Holmes.

Such a contention is without merit.

As Appellant pointed out in her opening brief at 7, both
the Utah and United States Supreme Courts have held that the
stopping of a vehicle and detention of its occupants is a seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.

See State v. Cole, 674

P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979).

The State confuses the issue by arguing that Prouse and

Cole "speak of the stopping of the automobile and the detention of
the occupant (emphasis in original)" and that the stopping of the
vehicle alone does not therefore constitute a seizure.

Respondent's

Brief at 12. On the contrary, as this Court pointed out in State v.
Baird, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 41 (November 1, 1988), n[a]ny time a
police officer stops an automobile the stop necessarily involves
detention and therefore is a level two encounter requiring
reasonable, articulable suspicion [citations omitted]."
Furthermore, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (cited by the
State on page 13 of its brief), the United States Supreme Court
stated:
[W]e hold that when an officer's observations lead
him reasonably to suspect that a particular
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in
the country, he may stop the car briefly and
investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must
be "reasonably related in scope to the
justification for their initiation." 392 US, at
29, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S Ct 1868. The officer may
question the driver and passengers about their
citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask
them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any
further detention or search must be based on
consent or probable cause.
- 2 -

This passage clarifies that the stopping of a vehicle necessarily
involves the detention of its passengers and is therefore a seizure.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), cited by the
State in its brief at 8-9/ does not support the State's argument
that the initial stop of Ms. Holmes was not a seizure.

In Mimms,

the officer lawfully stopped the vehicle based on the vehicle's
expired license plates.

The office therefore had a reasonable

suspicion to justify the stop.

The Mimms court pointed out:

In this case, unlike Terry v. Ohio, there is no
question about the propriety of the restrictions
on respondent's freedom of movement. Respondent
was driving an automobile with expired license
tags in violation of the Pennsylvania Motor
Vehicle Code.
434 U.S. at 109.
The Mimms court held that after a vehicle was lawfully
stopped, an officer could ask the driver to step out of the vehicle
in order to protect the officer's safety.

The impact of Mimms was

to allow officers who had legally stopped a car to ask the driver to
step outside the car without needing to establish that the officer
had a reasonable suspicion the driver was armed or might flee. The
Mimms safety rationale for allowing an officer to ask a driver to
step out of the car is simply inapplicable to this case where the
initial stop or seizure of the vehicle and its occupants was not
justified by a reasonable suspicion.
While a few courts have extended the Mimms safety
rationale to allow an officer to ask a passenger to step out of a#
vehicle, in such cases, the legality of the initial stop of the

- 3 -

vehicle is not an issue; rather, the legality of ordering the
passenger out of the car after making a legal stop of the vehicle is
the issue.

The decisions in such cases are generally based on a

safety rationale and often involve facts suggesting the passenger
might pose a threat to the officer's safety.

See e.g. People v.

Livigni, 88 A.D.2d 386, 453 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1982), aff'd, 58 N.Y.S.2d
894, 460 N.Y.S.2d 530, 447 N.E.2d 1324 (1981), where the officer
ordered the passenger out of the vehicle at gunpoint after observing
an empty gun holster in plain view in the passenger compartment.
State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), cited by
the State on page 9 of its brief, is similarly inapplicable to the
State's argument that no seizure occurred when the officers detained
the vehicle and its occupants in the instant case.

In Ferrise, the

officers stopped the vehicle because it was proceeding the wrong way
on a one-way street.

The initial detention was therefore based on

the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion, and the issue
presented to the Ferrise court was whether opening the passenger
door exceeded the scope of that detention.
State v. Trujillo, 749 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) is also
inapplicable to a determination of whether a seizure occurred in the
instant case since Trujillo did not involve the stopping of a
vehicle.
The State's effort to characterize the initial stop of
the vehicle and its occupants as an incident that did not amount to
a seizure and therefore is not entitled to fourth amendment
protection is without foundation.

The State's circular reasoning
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that no seizure occurred until "after Lieutenant Gray saw defendant
try to hide the roll of towels and then disclaim ownership of the
towels" (Respondent's Brief at 12) and that "[b]y then, Lieutenant
Gray had reasonable suspicion to retrieve the towels and unroll them
based on defendant's actions" (Ij3. ) totally ignores the fact that
the officers required a moving vehicle on a public road to pull to
the side of the road, then immediately approached its occupants. A
seizure of Ms. Holmes and the driver occurred when the officers
stopped the vehicle in which Ms. Holmes was a passenger.

To argue

otherwise makes a mockery of the fourth amendment and confuses the
issues presented in the instant case.

POINT II
THE OFFICERS LACKED A REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
DETAIN MS. HOLMES.
(Reply to Point III of Respondent's Brief)
In Point I of her opening brief, Appellant discussed in
detail her argument that the officers did not have a reasonable
suspicion based on articulable facts to justify detaining her.
Appellant takes this opportunity to reply briefly to some of the
factual characterizations argued by the State.
In the last paragraph on page 13 of its brief, the State
lists three areas in support of a reasonable suspicion.

While the

experience of the officers must be given some deference, such
experience alone is not enough to justify a detention.

The

reasonable suspicion standard would be meaningless if experienced
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officers could simply say they were suspicious and therefore stopped
an individual, without backing up that "suspicion" with articulable
facts.
While Officer Shelton did testify that he was familiar
with the "normal scenario for prostitution in the area" (R. 39 at
6), such familiarity is merely part of his experience and not an
additional factor to be considered.

Furthermore, the officer never

outlined what the "normal scenario" is, and it is not clear how the
facts in the instant case might fit within such "normal scenario."
This "familiarity" adds nothing to the reasonable suspicion analysis.
The State suggests that both officers saw Ms. Holmes
walking slowly and "noted that her walking pace was consistent with
prostitution."
inaccurate.

Respondent's Brief at 14. This suggestion is

While Ms. Holmes' pace and manner of walking was one

factor considered by Sergeant Shelton, Shelton's superior (R. 39 at
4), Lieutenant Gray, observed "nothing unusual" about her walk
(T. 35). This difference in interpretation by two trained officers,
with the superior finding "nothing unusual" about the walk,
emphasizes the subjective nature of this factor.

The State's

assertion that both officers considered the walk consistent with
prostitution is incorrect, and a conclusion by one officer that
Ms. Holmes walked like a prostitute adds little to the reasonable
suspicion analysis.
The State also mischaracterizes the driving pattern of
the vehicle as evasive.

Sergeant Shelton "conjectured" (T. 10) that

the pair in the car had made a prostitution deal, then realized that
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they were being followed (T. 10). However, as pointed out in
Appellant's opening brief at 19, the officers were in an unmarked
car and not in uniform; nothing in the record suggests either the
driver or Ms. Holmes was aware of the officers prior to the
detention.

While the route taken by the driver might have seemed to

be somewhat indirect, it did not establish an attempt to evade the
officers.
Finally, the State argues that the additional factors of
trying to hide the towels and disclaiming ownership "increased the
reasonable suspicion on the officer's part to detain defendant and
check the towels."

Respondent's Brief at 15.

This ignores the

obvious—Ms. Holmes had already been detained when the officer saw
the towels.

The officer was in a place he had no right to be as a

result of illegally stopping the car in which Ms. Holmes was a
passenger.

The officer's viewing of the towels was not one of the

items he listed to justify the detention and is not a factor to be
considered in justifying the stop.
The officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify the
detention of Ms. Holmes, and the evidence seized from her must
therefore be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Holmes
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court with an order to suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges

- 7 -

or provide for a new trial without such illegally seized evidence.
Respectfully submitted this

'H"

day of December, 1988.
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